The Creation of Effective Property Rights
By HERSCHEL I. GROSSMAN* To say that an agent has an effective property right means that this agent controls the allocation of some valuable resources and the distribution of the fruits of this allocation. Traditionally, general-equilibrium models have taken effective property rights to be given and have been concerned only with analyzing the allocation of resources among productive uses and the distribution of the resulting product. However, this formulation of the economic problem is incomplete, because it neglects the fact that the appropriative activities by which agents create the effective property rights that inform allocation and distribution are themselves an alternative use of scarce resources.
This paper develops two general-equilibrium models in which agents allocate scarce time and effort to creating effective property rights to valuable resources. 1 In contrast to much of the literature on property rights, both of these models relegate the state and the legal system to the background. Although political theory typically views the state to be the enforcer of cooperative action to protect property rights, the existence of a state and a legal system is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of effective property rights.
2 Even with an advanced modern state and legal system, the single most important action that one takes to secure property is probably the purely private activity of locking one's doors. The two models in this paper differ in their specifications of the state of nature that exists prior to the creation of effective property rights. In one model, the valuable resources are initially in a common pool. Examples include wild animals, fish, or plants that agents want to harvest, minerals that agents want to extract, or land that agents want to cultivate or to use for grazing, but over which no agent as yet has created an effective property right. In this model, agents create effective property rights by using time and effort to appropriate resources from the common pool.
In the other model, agents initially have claims, which can be more or less secure, to the valuable resources. These claims can be natural in the sense that they arose in the process of discovery or creation of these resources. Examples include a person's claim to his own ideas or to things that he has produced with his own hands. Alternatively, these claims can result from prior appropriation of resources from a common pool. Examples include claims that agents staked out to public lands, as in the California Gold Rush of 1849. 3 In this model, agents create effective property rights, or more precisely, convert initial claims into effective property rights, by using time and effort to defend their own initial claims and to challenge * Department of Economics, Brown University, Providence, RI 02912, and Russell Sage Foundation. Minseong Kim and Stergios Skaperdas have given me helpful comments.
1 In a brief and long-neglected contribution Trygve Haavelmo (1954 pp. 91-98 ) provided a canonical generalequilibrium model of the allocation of resources between productive and appropriative activities. Over the years, a number of authors have reinvented and extended Haavelmo's formalization of this problem. The present paper builds most directly on the analysis of Winston Bush and Lawrence Mayer (1974) . Other related papers include Stergios Skaperdas (1992) , Jack Hirshleifer (1995) , and Grossman and Minseong Kim (1995) . In contrast to the present paper, these papers assume that agents use only a single resource both to appropriate resources and to produce consumables.
2 Effective property rights are synonymous with what Dani Rodrik (2000) calls "control rights." Rodrik contrasts control rights with the formal property rights entailed in legal ownership. Rodrik writes, "The key word is 'control' rather than 'ownership.' Formal property rights do not count for much if they do not confer control rights. By the same token, sufficiently strong control rights may do the trick even in the absence of formal property rights" (p. 5). Many authors, however, stress that the formal property rights enhance control rights (see e.g., Lee Alston et al., 1996) . In a more abstract context, Grossman (2000) derives conditions under which the existence of a state that protects property rights is or is not a Pareto improvement over anarchy, whereas Juan Mendoza (1999) derives conditions under which the state chooses to free-ride on the efforts of private agents to protect property rights.
3 In this example, in allocating time and effort to the competition to stake out claims to resources, agents should anticipate having to defend these claims subsequently. I leave the modeling of such a two-stage process for another time. 347 the initial claims of others. Relative success in challenging and defending initial claims determines the security of initial claims.
I. The Creation of Property Rights from a Common Pool of Resources
Consider a group of n ϩ 1 identical unitary agents, n ʦ {1, 2, 3, ... }. These agents can be individuals, or they can be groups, such as families, tribes, or even sovereign states, as long as one can assume that these coalitions act as unitary agents. Each agent is endowed with one unit of inalienable time and effort.
Let there also be (n ϩ 1) E divisible units of valuable resources, which are initially in a common pool. The analysis assumes, for simplicity, that resources are nondurable and nonrenewable. The appropriation of resources from the common pool requires time and effort. Also, both time and effort and resources are inputs into the production of consumables. Each agent must choose how to allocate its endowment of time and effort between the activities of appropriating from the common pool and production. 4 To model the creation of effective property rights by appropriation from a common pool, let i, j ϭ 1, 2, ... , n ϩ 1, and assume that
where e i denotes the amount of resources that agent i appropriates from the common pool and where r i and r j denote the amounts of time and effort that agents i and j allocate to the appropriative competition. 5 Equation (1) simply says the following:
Agent i creates an effective property right to a fraction of the resources in the common pool that equals the fraction that agent i contributes to the total time and effort that the n ϩ 1 agents allocate to the appropriative competition.
The appropriative competition modeled by equation (1) could involve such disparate processes as a nonviolent scramble, a division under the threat of force, or a violent struggle. In this respect, equation (1) is like a standard black-box production function. Equation (1) does not indicate how agents appropriate from the common pool any more than a production function indicates how to make cars.
Turning to the technology of production, let ᐉ i denote the amount of time and effort that agent i allocates to the production of consumables, and let c i denote agent i's consumption. Assume that c i depends on ᐉ i and on e i according to a standard Cobb-Douglas technology:
The parameter ␣ in equation (2) measures the importance of resources relative to time and effort for producing consumables. Equation (1) implies that time and effort are essential to the appropriation of resources from the common pool. Equation (2) implies that resources appropriated from the common pool are essential for production. Thus, equations (1) and (2) together imply that the dominant strategy of each agent, taking as given the allocation decisions of other agents, is to allocate time and effort to the appropriative competition. This model precludes the possibility that the agents would choose to allow the valuable resources to remain in the common pool. 6 Agent i chooses r i and ᐉ i to maximize its consumption subject to r i ϩ ᐉ i ϭ 1. Assume that in making these choices agent i takes other agents' choices, r j for all j i, as given. Thus, the first-order condition for the solution to agent i's choice problem is
Equation (3) says that agent i chooses r i such that the marginal benefit of r i in increasing the amount of resources that agent i appropriates from the common pool equals the marginal cost of r i in decreasing the amount of time and effort that agent i allocates to production. Equation (3) implies a unique, symmetrical equilibrium in which r i equals r j for all pairs i and j. Using this equality and equations (1) and (2) to solve equation (3), one obtains the following for the equilibrium allocation of time and effort:
Equation (4) implies that the amount of time and effort that each agent allocates to the appropriative competition is larger (and hence, the amount of time and effort that each agent allocates to production is smaller) the larger is n, the scale of the economy, and the larger is ␣, the relative importance of resources for producing consumables. The effect of n obtains because in a symmetrical equilibrium the marginal effect of an agent's allocating more time and effort to the appropriative competition on the amount of resources that the agent appropriates from the common pool is increasing in n. 7 Also, in equation (4) the allocation of time and effort does not depend on E, the per capita amount of resources in the common pool. This result obtains because in this model agents allocate time and effort either to appropriation or to production, and the return to both activities increases proportionately with the amount of resources in the common pool.
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II. The Conversion of Initial Claims into Effective Property Rights
As an alternative to resources being initially in a common pool, assume now that each agent has an initial nonoverlapping claim to E units of resources. 9 The existence of initial claims creates an essential distinction between defending one's own initial claim and challenging the initial claims of other agents. In this model, each agent must choose how to allocate its time and effort among these distinct appropriative activities and production.
For simplicity, assume that there are only two agents, agent 1 and agent 2. To model the challenging and defending of initial claims, let i, j ϭ 1, 2, and let p i and p j denote the fractions of their initial claims that agents i and j successfully defend. 10 analysis of the creation of effective property rights can be regarded as complementary to the analysis of cooperation, with the present analysis becoming relevant when agents have exhausted opportunities for amicable sharing of resources. 7 We can view the positive relation between r i and n as consistent with the common observation that life is more competitive in large cities than in small towns. I thank Harl Ryder for this observation. 8 extend this model by assuming that, if resources are scarce, then consumption and, hence, appropriated resources have a large effect on the probability of survival. Given this assumption, agents allocate more time and effort to the appropriative competition the smaller the per capita amount of resources in the common pool. In contrast, Grossman (1992) and Kai Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) assume that the alternative cost of time and effort allocated to appropriative conflict is independent of the value of the appropriable endowment. In these models, the allocation of time and effort to appropriative conflict is positively related to the value of the appropriable endowment.
9 A more complete analysis would allow for differences among individuals in their initial claims. The present analysis shows that interpersonal differences are not essential for rationalizing appropriative conflict.
10 Generalizing the analysis to allow for many agents is not trivial, because the appropriate specification depends on the nature of the matching process involved in agents' challenging the initial claims of other agents. One possibility would have every agent challenging the initial claim of every other agent and defending its initial claim from a challenge by every other agent. A more ambitious possibility would be to introduce a fixed cost of challenging the initial claim of another agent. In this setup, each agent would have to choose which subset of initial claims to challenge.
In this model, p i measures the security of the agent i's initial claim. If p i equals 1, then this initial claim is perfectly secure. If p i is smaller than 1, then this initial claim is less than perfectly secure.
Using this notation, agent i creates an effective property right to e i units of resources, where
Equation (5) says that e i equals the amount of its own initial claim that agent i successfully defends plus the amount of the initial claim of agent j that agent i successfully challenges.
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To determine the security of initial claims, assume that
where g j denotes the fraction of its time and effort that agent j, j i, allocates to challenging the initial claim of agent i, and h i denotes the fraction of its time and effort that agent i allocates to defending its own initial claim. Equation (6) says that, if g j is positive, then p i is smaller the larger is g j relative to h i .
The parameter in equation (6) measures the effectiveness of time and effort allocated to challenging initial claims relative to time and effort allocated to defending initial claims. This parameter reflects the technology for the challenging and defending of initial claims. It also can reflect social institutions, such as formal property rights entailed in legal ownership or an informal norm of respect for initial claims, that facilitate either the challenging and or the defending of initial claims. The restriction that is smaller than 1 insures that agent i could not increase the equilibrium value of e i by giving its initial claim to agent j and then challenging that claim.
Like equation (1), which described the creation of property rights from a common pool of resources, equation (6) is a black box. It does not specify the processes by which claims are challenged and defended. For example, the outcome modeled by equation (6) could involve either a division under the threat of force or a violent struggle.
Assume again that agent i's consumption, c i , depends on e i and on the amount of time and effort that agent i allocates to production, ᐉ i , according to the Cobb-Douglas technology specified in equation (2). Agent i chooses h i , g i , and ᐉ i to maximize its consumption subject to h i ϩ g i ϩ ᐉ i ϭ 1. Assume that in making these choices agent i takes agent j's choices of g j and h j as given. Thus, the first-order conditions for the solution to agent i's choice problem are
Equation (7) says that agent i chooses h i such that the marginal benefit of h i in increasing the amount of its own initial claim that it successfully defends equals the marginal cost of h i in decreasing the amount of time and effort that it allocates to production. Equation (8) says that agent i chooses g i such that the marginal benefit of g i in increasing the amount of the initial claim of agent j that agent i successfully challenges equals the marginal cost of g i in decreasing the amount of time and effort that it allocates to production.
Equations (7) and (8) imply a unique symmetrical equilibrium in which h i equals h j , and in which g i equals g j . Using these equalities and equations (2), (5), and (6) to solve equations (7) and (8), one obtains the following for the equilibrium allocation of time of effort:
for all i and j.
11 In Grossman and Kim (1995) , it is shown how the analysis could easily incorporate possible destruction of resources as the result of the challenging and defending of claims.
Equation (9) implies that the equilibrium values of h i and g j are equal and, over the range 0 Ͻ Ͻ 1, are larger the larger is . Equation (9) also implies that the amount of time and effort that each agent allocates to defending and challenging initial claims is larger the larger is ␣, the relative importance of resources for producing consumables, but that the allocation of time and effort does not depend on E, the amount of resources to which each agent has an initial claim. These results about ␣ and E are analogous to results obtained in the preceding analysis of appropriation from a common pool.
Because g j is positive, equation (6) indicates that p i , the fraction of its initial claim that agent i successfully defends, is smaller than 1. In this model, initial claims to resources are less than perfectly secure. Also, because h i equals g j , p i equals 1/(1 ϩ ). In equilibrium the security of initial claims depends only on , the effectiveness of time and effort allocated to challenging initial claims relative to time and effort allocated to defending initial claims.
III. Perfectly Secure Initial Claims
Casual observation suggests that, in many, if not most, cases, agents in fact do not challenge the initial claims of other agents, and as a result, initial claims to resources are perfectly secure. Examples range from personal possessions most of the time to most international borders most of the time. There are several ways to modify the model to allow the possibility of an equilibrium in which initial claims to resources are perfectly secure.
(i) A Fixed Cost of Challenging Initial
Claims.-Formally, one can introduce such a fixed cost, denoted by , Ͼ 0, by assuming, in place of equation (2), that c j ϭ e j ␣ ᐉ j 1 Ϫ ␣ Ϫ for g j Ͼ 0, with c j ϭ e j ␣ for g j ϭ 0. If were sufficiently large relative to E, then, even if agent i were to set h i equal to zero, agent j would set g j equal to zero. This analysis shows that a large enough fixed cost of challenging initial claims would make initial claims perfectly secure. However, it seems unlikely that large fixed costs are sufficiently pervasive to account for all cases of perfectly secure initial claims.
(ii) Social Institutions.-Suppose that social institutions, such as either formal property rights entailed in enforceable legal ownership or an informal norm of respect for initial claims, in addition to influencing the parameter , also directly augment the time and effort that agents allocate to defending their initial claims. Formally, one can replace h i in equation (6) with h i ϩ , Ͼ 0, where measures this additive effect of social institutions. The analysis in Konrad and Skaperdas (1998) Grossman and Kim (1995) .
This model of deterrence suggests an explanation for the fact that one commonly observes not only individuals, but also groups, such as tribes and nations, who allocate resources to defending their own claims to property but do not challenge the claims of others. For example, in our society, although everyone allocates some resources to protecting property from theft, relatively few people engage in activities like robbery and burglary. This analysis also suggests that differences in , which can reflect differences in the technology for challenging and defending initial claims as well as differences in social institutions, account for why initial claims are perfectly secure in some cases but not in others.
